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Abstract
In a panel framework that includes 18 countries, this paper studies the short and long run
effect of financial development on economic growth and the determinants of financial
development in Latin America. Financial development shows a positive effect on economic
growth in the long run, but a negative effect in the short run for the full sample. When the
sample is divided by income levels, this result holds only for the high income group. For
the low income group, financial development has no significant effect on economic growth
in the short run or in the long run. In the analysis of the determinants of financial
development in Latin America, greater financial openness and lower country risk are
associated with higher levels of financial development. From the components of the
country risk index (financial, economic, and political risk) only the political risk index
comes up positively significant. From the components of the political risk index, only law
and order and government stability have a positive significant effect on financial
development.
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I. Introduction
The improvement of financial markets in Latin American countries in the last two
decades is prominent and well known. Private credit as share of GDP for the Latin
American region went from 17 percent in the period 1970-1974, to 31 percent in the period
2005-2008 (period average).1 The significant development of the financial sector in Latin
America has led to an increasing interest on studying the relationship between financial
development and economic growth in this region.
While there is a vast amount of work on the finance-growth link, there is no
consensus on the impact of financial development on economic growth. While, several
theoretical and empirical analyses show that financial development leads to economic
growth, some provide evidence that financial development has no significant effect on
economic growth. Others argue that the effect is dependent on certain conditions, and that
financial development might have a negative effect in some cases. Thus, the study of the
finance-growth link continues to be a topic of interest. There has also been an increasing
interest on studying what factors explain financial development.
This paper studies the impact of financial development on economic growth in the
short and long run and the determinants of financial development in Latin America. This
analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it expands on Loayza’s and
Ranciere (2006) study of the impact of financial development on economic growth by
focusing only on the Latin American region and expanding the sample period. Second,
along the work of Rioja and Valev (2004a), this analysis studies the long and short term
effect of financial development on economic growth across different income groups. Third,
in relation of the study of the determinants of financial development, this paper expands on
1
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Chin’s and Ito (2006) and Baltagi’s et al. (2009) work by focusing on Latin American
countries, expanding the sample period, and considering other factors related to institutions
and country stability as possible determinants of financial development.
This paper answers the following questions for the Latin American region: 1) What
is the effect of financial development on economic growth at different time frames and
across countries with different income levels? 2) What factors lead to greater financial
development? Studying financial development in the Latin American region is relevant for
two reasons. First, Latin America is a natural laboratory to study the impact and
determinants of financial development because these countries have experienced significant
improvements in the financial sector in the last decades. Second, previous empirical
evidence has shown that we cannot generalize in relation to financial development and
pursuing region specific analyses is necessary. Countries in the region share a historical,
political and socioeconomic background, which is important to consider when studying
financial development.
Using panel data during the period 1961-2007 in a panel framework for 18 Latin
American countries, the main findings in relation to the effect of financial development in
economic growth are the following. For the full sample, financial development has a
significant positive effect on economic growth in the long run, but a significant negative
effect in the short run. This finding goes according to Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006)
finding. However, when the sample is divided in two groups, this result only holds for the
high income group. For the low income group, financial development has no significant
effect in the long run or in the short run. In the analysis of the determinants of financial
development, using 5 year average observations during the period 1970-2007, greater
2

financial openness and lower country risk are associated with greater financial
development. Financial openness seems to benefit the most in those countries that are
relatively closed. When the country risk index is disaggregated by the financial, political,
and economic risk indices, only the political risk index has a positive significant effect on
financial development (the higher the value of the index, the less political risk there is).
There are only two components from the political risk index that have a significant positive
effect on financial development, law and order and government stability.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief literature review on
the finance-growth link and on the determinants of financial development. Sections III and
IV describe the data and the methodology. Section V presents the results, and Section VI
concludes.

II. Literature Review
A. The Finance-Growth Link
While the general belief is that financial development has a positive effect on
economic growth (supply leading hypothesis), there is theoretical and empirical work
supporting that this effect is non-existent and that financial development is just a
consequence of economic growth (demand following hypothesis). Financial development
can be generally defined as increasing access to credit, and the positive effect of financial
development on growth is derived from the effect financial development has on capital
accumulation and productivity (Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000). With the development of
the financial sector there is greater access to capital that results in more funding available
for good investment opportunities. Greater access to capital leads to greater labor
3

specialization and more access to new technology (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Saint-Paul,
1992). Consequently, improvements in capital markets lead to greater economic growth.2
On the other hand, there has been some skepticism about the benefits derived from
financial development. There are three main reasons to be skeptical about the impact of
financial development on economic growth. First, there is research that supports the
demand following hypothesis, where financial development is just a consequence of
economic growth (Shan, 2005). Second, the impact of financial development on economic
growth seems to be dependent on certain conditions. There is empirical evidence showing
that the effect of financial development on growth is different across regions and among
countries with different income levels, levels of financial development, and institutional set
ups (see Aghion et al. 2005; Blanco, 2009; De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995; Rioja and
Valev 2004a,b; Shen and Lee, 2006; among others). Third, financial development can
produce greater macroeconomic volatility, becoming a destabilizing force in the economy
(Loayza and Ranciere, 2006). When financial development leads to volatility, it is expected
that financial development will have a negative effect on economic growth. According to
Loayza and Ranciere (2006), the short run effect of financial development on economic
growth might be reflected negative economic growth as a result of macroeconomic
instability, and the long run effect is expected to be positive in terms of economic growth.
Thus, looking at the impact of financial development at different time frames is necessary.
In the Latin American context, where countries have experienced periods of
significantly volatility, distinguishing the short and long run effect of financial
development is of special interest to policymakers. When studying the impact of financial

2

Refer to Blanco (2009) and Levine (2005) for a thorough discussion of the literature on the finance-growth
link. Odhiambo (2007) presents a good discussion on the supply leading and demand following hypotheses.
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development on economic growth, it is also important to keep in mind that financial
development might have a differential impact on growth depending on specific country
conditions. Some countries will be better equipped to absorb the influx of credit. It is likely
that specific country characteristics, in relation to their level of development (i.e. income)
might determine a country’s ability to use the influx of credit productively. For this reason,
studying the impact of financial development for countries with different income levels is
relevant for the design of future policies related to financial markets in Latin America.

B. The Sources of Finance
In the review of the literature, the factors that have been considered as the main
determinants of financial development are the degree of openness, institutions, and political
stability. Liberalization of the goods and capital markets are associated with greater
financial development (Baltagi et al., 2009; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Klein and Olivei, 2008).
Openness to trade and capital flows have been proposed as important determinants of
financial development. According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), there will be a group of
people who will oppose to financial development due to the competition it brings. With
trade and financial liberalization, the power of those who are opposed to financial
development is significantly weakened. Therefore, substantial financial reforms take place
when the power of interests groups is diminished with openness, leading to greater financial
development.
Financial liberalization is associated with the strengthening of the financial system
in two ways.3 First, as a result of financial liberalization, the entrance of foreign banks into

3

Refer to Chinn and Ito (2006) and Klein and Olivei (2008) for a comprehensive literature review of the
channels through which financial liberalization leads to greater financial development.
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the domestic financial sector leads to an increase in available loanable funds and efficiency.
Efficiency in the financial sector increases significantly with financial liberalization since
there is greater competition and greater pressure to reform the financial sector. Second,
Klein and Olivei (2008) argue that a virtuous cycle of greater savings and efficiency is
created with increasing capital account openness because financial intermediaries are able
to achieve economies of scale.
Furthermore, institutions seem to play a key role explaining the differences in
financial development across countries.4 According to Chinn and Ito (2006), there are two
different categories of institutions that have been considered as important determinants of
financial development: 1) Institutions that affect the economy as a whole, and 2)
Institutions that affect the financial sector. In the first group, the relevant institutions are
related to bureaucratic quality, law and order, and control of corruption, among others.
Because these institutional factors directly affect the way of doing business and relate to
perceptions on the stability of the legal system, it is expected that they are associated with
greater levels of financial development.
The second group of institutions includes those institutions that specifically affect
the financial sector. According to Djankov et al. (2007), institutions that increase the power
of creditors and the access to lending information are crucial for financial development.
When creditor rights are enforced, credit is likely to expand because creditors feel more
protected against default. Creditors are also more likely to lend when they are able to get
more information about potential lenders. Greater financial depth is expected when there is

4

Beck and Levine (2005) present an excellent review of the literature on the relationship between institutions
and financial development.
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an increase in the access to information on lenders and protection to private credit
institutions.
Furthermore, the stability of a specific country might significantly affect capital
markets. The degree to which there is stability in a country affects investors’ perceptions,
and consequently their willingness to invest in that country. According to Roe and Siegel
(2009), a country's capacity to protect investors is related to political stability. Thus,
countries with unstable political systems offer low protection to investors.
Empirical evidence on the importance of openness and institutions as factors
explaining financial development is abundant. Herger’s et al. (2008) cross-sectional
analysis shows that trade openness has a significant effect on financial development. In a
panel framework that includes only less developed countries, Baltagi et al. (2009) find that
trade and financial openness explain financial development. They interact trade and
financial openness, and find that this interaction term is negative. They conclude that while
financial development requires both types of openness, relatively closed economies benefit
the most from opening up to trade or capital. Chinn and Ito (2006) find that at certain
institutional threshold, financial liberalization has a positive effect on financial
development. Results from Klein’s and Olivei (2008) are along the lines of Chinn’s and Ito
(2006) findings. Klein and Olivei (2008) find that institutions drive the positive effect of
financial liberalization on financial development, where developed countries that have
better institutions get greater benefits from financial liberalization. The openness to trade
and capital flows experienced during the process of globalization is likely to be associated
with institutional reforms that significantly affect capital markets (Mishkin, 2009).

7

There is also empirical evidence on the impact of institutions and political stability
on financial development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provide evidence that institutions
that affect all sectors of the economy have a significant direct effect on financial
development. They show empirically that property rights and contracting institutions are
important determinants of financial development. Beck et al. (2003) also find that
institutions, either shaped by legal origins or initial endowments, have a significant effect
on financial development in a sample of 70 former colonies. Andrianova et al. (2008) also
find evidence that institutions related to governance have a significant effect on financial
development, where lower quality of institutions are associated with greater government
ownership in the financial sector. In relation to institutions that affect capital markets,
Djankov et al. (2007) present strong empirical evidence that creditor rights and access to
lending information are important determinants of financial development. Additionally,
Roe and Siegel (2009) present empirical evidence showing that political instability explains
financial backwardness.
While there are several papers on the determinants of financial development, few
have taken a regional approach. When studying the factors that lead to greater financial
depth is important to focus on regions that share historical, political, and socio-economic
backgrounds. It cannot be expected that the same factors that explain financial development
in a specific country in Asia or Africa should explain capital markets in Latin America. By
taking a regional approach to the study of the sources of finance, more specific policy
recommendations could be provided.
III. Data

8

The data used in this analysis is divided in two parts. For the first part, which
focuses on determining the impact of financial development on economic growth in the
short and long run, yearly observations between 1961 and 2007 are used. For the second
part, which focuses on studying the determinants of financial development in Latin
America, five year average observations between 1970 and 2007 are used. The 18 Latin
American countries included in both parts of the analysis are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Countries were selected in the basis of data availability over a long period of
time.
This analysis uses the indicator of financial development most commonly used in
previous work, private credit as a share of GDP.5 This indicator comes mainly from Beck’s,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) data on financial structure updated in 2010. From this
dataset, a large number of observations were missing for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru,
and Uruguay. Thus, private credit as a share of GDP was estimated for those countries
following Beck’s, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) methodology and using data from
the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010).6

5

This analysis emphasizes on financial development in relation to the banking sector. While studying the
impact of equity markets on growth and its determinants for the Latin American region is relevant, consistent
data across the region for a large period of time is not available. Furthermore, financial markets in Latin
America are more based on the banking sector, which makes the focus on private credit as an indicator of
financial development a good approach.
6
Constructed data on financial development indicators in Latin America is available upon request.
Correlation between the constructed data and the available observations in Beck’s, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine (2000) dataset is always around 0.99, which confirms the use of the appropriate methodology. For
Colombia, some missing observations were filled in with linear interpolation.
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Data on real GDP per capita, population, government spending as a share of GDP,
and trade openness is obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2009).7 Data on
financial openness is obtained from Chinn and Ito (2008), and data on inflation is obtained
from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010). Data on banking crisis was obtained
from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Data on country risk
is obtained from the Political Risk Services Group (2010). Other data used to construct a
measure of trade openness that is exogenous in the growth equation comes from United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE, 2010) and Mayer and
Zignago (2006). Table 1 includes a description of the variables used in this analysis and
their sources. Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics for both parts of the analysis.

IV. Methodology
A. Impact of Financial Development on Economic Growth
When studying the impact of financial development on economic growth in the
short and long run for Latin America, this analysis follows Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006)
methodology closely. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) propose using the Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999).8 For the PMG estimator, an
autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL(p,q,q,…,q)) dynamic panel specification is applied.
A vector error correction model (VECM) is considered under this specification, where the
short run dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from
equilibrium. The ARDL(p,q,q,…,q) used for the PMG estimator is specified as follows
7

Real GDP per capita is estimated extrapolating 1996 values in international dollars, which make this
indicator comparable across countries.
8
Refer to Loayza and Ranciere (2006) for an explanation of the appropriateness of the PMG estimator when
disentangling the finance-growth link and a description of this methodology. Refer also to Blackburne and
Frank (2007) for a description of the PMG estimator and how it is estimated in Stata.
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Where yi is a t x 1 vector of the observations of the dependent variable of the ith
group, Xi is a t x k matrix of the regressors that vary across groups and time periods, is a
t x1 vector of 1s. One of the main requirements of this model specification is the existence
of a long run relationship between yit and Xit, where the error-correcting speed of
adjustment term for the long run relationship represented by

i must

be significantly

negative (and no lower than -2). The long run relationship between yit and Xit for each
group is expressed as follows
yit

Where

( i' / i )

it

it

(3)

is a stationary process. For the long run homogeneity assumption, the

coefficients on Xi are the same across groups. Long run coefficients of Xi are expressed as
i

= - i/ i, where

i

= . In the PMG estimator, while the long run coefficients are equal

across groups, the intercept, short run coefficients, and error variances differ across
countries.9
9

Please refer to Blackburne and Frank (2007) for a good explanation of the specification of PMG model.
Asteriou and Hall (2007) also provide a brief discussion of the PMG estimator.
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For the PMG estimation in this analysis, real GDP growth (first difference of the
natural log of real GDP per capita) is the dependent variable and financial development
(private credit in natural logs) is in the right hand side of the equation. Initial GDP per
capita (natural log), government size (natural log), trade, and inflation are included as
control variables.10 A dynamic specification of the form ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1) is used, and all
variables are time-demeaned.11 All independent variables are entered in levels for the long
run relationships and in first difference for the short run relationships. The ARDL form
specified above includes the first and second lag of the first difference of real GDP and
private credit as regressors. Annual observations between 1961 and 2007 are used for this
part of the analysis. Because of the lag structure of the model, estimations will include
observations between 1964 and 2007 (44 observations per country).

B. The Determinants of Financial Development
The approach taken to find out what factors explain financial development in Latin
America in this analysis is similar to the one used by Baltagi et al. (2009). The dynamic
panel General Method of Moments (GMM) suggested by Arellano and Bond (AB, 1991) is
implemented and an ARDL(p, q,q,…,q) specification is considered for the AB estimator.
For the AB estimator, the first lag of the dependent variable is included in the right hand
side of the equation, which leads to endogeneity issues since the lag of the dependent
variable is determined by the error term. This endogeneity problem biases the estimates
provided by the general GMM. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose differencing the data to
These variables are constructed following Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) approach; refer to Table 1 for a
description of how these variables were constructed.
11
Lag lengths selected based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions. The number of lags is
selected in a way where the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the regression is minimized. This process
is done for each panel.
10
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address for the endogeneity of the right hand side variables and for specific country
characteristics. The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM uses lagged levels of the dependent
variable as instruments to address for the endogeneity of the dependent variable. The model
specification of the AB estimator can be expressed as

yit

yi,t

1

it i

it

(4)

Equation 4, which represents first difference transformation and removes the
constant term and the individual effects, shows that the lag of the dependent variable is
included as regressor and Xit is the tN x k matrix of the explanatory variables. For this
estimation, the instruments used are the available lags of the levels of the endogeneous
variables.
Arellano’s and Bond (1991) methodology is appropriate for datasets with many
panels and few periods. For this reason, and to smooth out short run fluctuations in the data,
five year average observations are considered in this part of the analysis. Five year average
observations are constructed using available observation between 1970 and 2007. Financial
development growth (the first difference of private credit as a share of GDP in natural log)
is used as dependent variable, and its first lag enters in the right hand side of the equation.
The real GDP per capita growth (first difference of real GDP per capita in natural log) and
a dummy for banking crisis are entered as control variables.12 The variables of interest that
enter in the right hand side of the equation are trade openness (natural log), financial
openness, the interaction between trade and financial openness, and the country risk

12

Time dummies were not included since they are not significant in most of the estimations, and their
inclusion leads to estimates that violate the assumption that idiosyncratic errors are independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d). Note that private credit and real GDP are entered in first difference initially as
we are interested on considering the relationship between the growth rates of these variables.
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index.13 The country risk index is a composite indicator of political, financial, and
economic risk indices. Thus, the model will be estimated by including the components of
the country risk index.14 Several indicators related to institutions and country stability
compose the political risk index, and the model will be estimated including these indicators
one at the time. Due to data unavailability, the time period is reduced when the institutional
and political stability variables are included. In the model specification shown in Equation
4, it is observed that the first difference is taken from all variables to transform the equation
into the difference GMM. The lagged levels of financial development growth are used to
form GMM-type instruments.

V. Results
A. Impact of Financial Development on Economic Growth
Table 4 presents the estimates obtained when using the PMG estimator to determine
the short and long run effect of financial development on economic growth for the full
sample. The first two columns show the coefficients and the standard errors for the full
sample. In this estimation, the long run coefficients of all control variables but inflation are
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients for initial GDP per capita and
government size are different than what was expected, but trade and inflation have the
expected signs. For the short run estimates, all control variables, but trade, are statistically

13

This analysis focuses on testing empirically the effect of financial openness on financial development,
which relates to the liberalization of the capital account. Financial liberalization is defined by Ranciere et al
(2008) as the deregulation of the domestic financial markets, in addition to the liberalization of the capital
account. Financial openness and financial liberalization terms are used interchangeable by several in the
literature, but it is important to make the distinction when doing empirical analyses. For example, Abiad and
Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008) construct an index of financial liberalization that focus on financial
reform and present an analysis of the factors explaining it. Chinn’s and Ito (2008) financial openness index,
which is used in this analysis, relates only to liberalization of the capital account.
14
Refer to Table 1 for a description of how is the country risk index constructed and its components.
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significant. Only the coefficient sign for initial GDP per capita is unexpected. The first lag
of the dependent variable is positive and statistically significant. Financial development has
a positive significant effect at the 1 percent level on economic growth in the long run. For
the short run, financial development has a negative effect, where only its first difference is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The first difference of the second lag of
financial development has a negative effect, but it is marginally significant (significant at
10 percent level). The positive and negative effect in the long and short run respectively,
goes according to Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) finding.
Following Blanco’s (2009) approach, this analysis also evaluates the possibility that
the effect of financial development is different across different income groups. Based on
countries’ real GDP per capita in the middle of the sample period (in year 1985), the
sample is divided in high and low income countries. The countries included in the high
income group are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The countries included in the low income group are
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Paraguay, and Peru. In Table 4, columns 3 and 4 present the coefficients and standard
errors for the high income group, and columns 5 and 6 show estimates for the low income
group. For the high income group the signs and significance of most coefficients stay the
same. Financial development shows a significant positive effect in the long run at the 1
percent level, but a marginally significant negative effect in the short run (10 percent level).
For the low income group, the significance and sign of the coefficients changes

15

dramatically. In this estimation, financial development shows no significant effect on
economic growth in the short or in the long run.15

B. Determinants of Financial Development
Estimates of the model of the determinants of financial development in Latin
America are shown in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, the first two columns show the
coefficients and standard errors for the baseline model that does not include variables
related to institutions or stability. In this estimation, real GDP growth has a positive
significant effect at the 1 percent level, which was expected. Banking crisis also has a
positive significant effect, which was unexpected. A reason why this coefficient might be
positive is that this indicator might capture the period of time where restructuring of the
financial sector takes place. Trade openness has a negative sign and it is not statistically
significant, which was unexpected. Financial openness and the interaction term between
financial and trade openness are significant at the 1 percent level. While the coefficient for
financial openness has a positive sign, its interactive term with trade openness is negative.
This finding goes according to Baltagi et al. (2009). The negative coefficient of the
interaction term implies that the effect of capital openness on financial development will be
larger for relatively closed economies than for relatively open economies.

15

A Hausman test was performed to ensure that the PMG estimates are preferred to the ones obtained from
the Mean Group (MG) estimator. The MG estimator fits the model separately for each group. The Hausman
test provides evidence that PMG estimates are preferred since we fail to reject the hypothesis that the
difference in coefficients is not systematic for the full sample. The test statistic for the parameters (joint test)
is equal to 7.06, with a probability of 0.22. Thus, the homogeneity restriction is not rejected jointly for all
parameters. Furthermore, the condition for the error-correction speed of adjustment is meet in all the
estimations, where i is statistically significant with a negative value greater than -2. Estimations were also
performed without Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago since it could be argued that these 2 countries do not share
the common characteristics of the rest of the sample. Results are the same when these countries are excluded.
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From the estimates shown in Table 5, we can observe that the lag of the dependent
variable is not statistically significant. This can lead us into questioning whether the
dynamic model panel approach, where the lagged dependent variable is included as a
regressor, is the adequate model. A lag length test provides evidence that one lag of the
financial development growth indicator is the adequate number of lags.16
In Table 5, Model 2 (columns 3 and 4) shows the estimates obtained when a
composite index of country risk is included. This country risk index has a significant
positive effect on financial development at the 5 percent level. Thus, as country risk
decreases (index increases) financial development increases. Model 3 (columns 5 and 6)
presents the estimates obtained when the components of the country risk index (economic,
financial and political risk indices) are included. These estimates show that only the
political risk index has a positive significant effect on financial development. This finding
suggests that a decrease on political risk (increase in the index) is beneficial for finance.
The model specified in Equation 4 is estimated with the 12 components of the
political risk index, where they are entered into the model one at the time to avoid
multicolinerarity issues.17 The components of the political risk index are closely related to
institutions and country stability. The indicators that account for institutions that affect the
economy as a whole and that are included in the political risk index are: corruption, law and
order, and bureaucratic quality. Investment profile index seems to be the indicator that
accounts for institutions that directly affect the financial sector since it is composed by
indicators related to contract viability, expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment
delays. It is expected that there is a close relationship between the investment profile index
16

Lag length selected using the ADF regressions, where the regression that minimizes the AIC is chosen (in a
panel set up).
17
See Table 1 for a description of the components of the political risk index.
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and our financial development indicator since investment profile will be related to
investment risk and consequently to the willingness to invest in a specific country. Thus,
there is an important feedback between these two indicators, and it is hoped that the AB
estimator allows for estimating the independent effect of financial sector institutions on
financial development. Other indicators related to country stability that compose the
political risk index are government stability, internal and external conflict, religious and
ethnic tensions, and democratic accountability.
Four components came out statistically significant when the model is estimated by
including each component of the political risk index one at the time, and the estimates are
shown in Table 6.18 Law and order and government stability have a positive significant
effect on financial development at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Investment
profile and internal conflict have a marginally significant effect on financial development
(10 percent level).19 From these estimations we can conclude that from the different
indicators that relate to institutions, law and order is the one that is relevant for the
development of the financial sector. Additionally, when looking at different indicators that
relate to country stability, government stability is the one that matters the most for financial
development.
In this analysis it is important to note that trade openness has a negative effect and it
is insignificant in most cases (it is significant only at the 10 percent level in two out of six
cases). In relation to openness, financial openness seems to be the key player in explaining
18

Estimates are shown only for those estimations in which the component of the political risk index is
significant. Other estimations that include the other components of the political risk index, one at the time, are
not included for purpose of space but are available upon request.
19
Note that in all the estimations the Sargan test shows that the instruments used are valid since we fail to
reject the hypothesis that the overindentifying restrictions are valid. The serial correlation tests also show that
the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) as required for the AB estimation.
In all AB estimations but one, we meet the conditions of rejecting first order autocorrelation and failing to
reject second order autocorrelation at the 5 percent level.
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financial development in Latin America. A possible explanation of this finding is the
sample period used. This analysis includes the period of 1990-2007 in most cases, which is
a period where financial markets experienced opened up siginificalty. In fact, the standard
deviation for the index of financial openness is more than double the standard deviation of
the trade openness indicator.

VI. Conclusion
In the analysis of the impact of financial development on economic growth, there
are two main findings. First, there seems to be evidence that financial development has a
positive effect in the long run, but a negative effect in the short run for the Latin American
region. This finding is relevant as it might relate to the financial crises experienced in the
Latin American region in the last couple of decades. This analysis provides evidence that
financial development might bring some instability that leads to lower economic growth in
the short run. Nonetheless, financial development seems to be associated with positive
economic growth in the long run, which should be considered when designing policies that
promote economic growth in Latin America.
Second, the estimation results obtained when the sample is separated by income
groups corroborate previous findings related to the fact that the effect of financial
development is dependent on certain conditions. This fact must also be taken into
consideration when policies that aim to promote economic growth through developing the
financial sector in the Latin American region are designed. Promoting the deepening of
financial markets seems to be beneficial for high income groups, but not for low income
groups. Therefore, financial reform should be a priority for those countries with relatively
19

higher income levels in Latin America, but not for all. For further research, disentangling
what conditions allow the relatively high income group to reap benefits from financial
development in the long run is necessary. Perhaps preconditions related to institutions or
certain financial development threshold might be relevant.
From the study of the determinants of financial development in Latin America, the
main findings can be summarized as follows. Financial openness seems to be playing a key
role on the development of financial markets in Latin America, where it has a robust
positive significant effect of great magnitude. The analysis here provides evidence showing
that financial openness will benefit the most, in terms of improving financial markets, those
countries that are relatively closed. Thus, those countries with trade restrictions will find
that liberalizing capital accounts can lead to significant expansions of credit.
This analysis shows that country risk, in relation to political risk, is also an
important source of finance in the region. In specific, law and order and government
stability seem to be important factors that affect financial development the most in Latin
American countries. From this finding, we can conclude that policies that focus on
promoting government stability and strengthening the legal system and its observance are
relevant for improving financial markets in the region. This is an important finding for
Latin America since the region has become relatively stable in the last decades. Therefore,
by ensuring the strengthening of democracies and promoting stability, financial markets
might be able to deepen in the future. Furthermore, ensuring that the legal system is strong
and impartial and citizens observe the law, would lead to the improvement of capital
markets. For further research, it will be interesting to evaluate whether there is a
relationship between financial openness and institutions. Furthermore, this analysis uses an
20

indicator of financial openness that relates to capital account openness. Future research
should consider a wider indicator of financial liberalization that accounts not only for the
openness of the capital account, but also for financial reforms and deregulation of the
domestic financial market.
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Table 1. Variable description and source
Variable description and source
Financial
development

Private credit as a share of GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine (2000) and Author’s construction using International Financial
Statistics (IMF, 2010).

GDP per capita

Real GDP per capita, Laspeyres constant prices. Source: Heston et al.
(2009).

Initial GDP per
capita

Initial GDP in the five year period divided by population in the actual year,
(time variant, different every year). Constructed using total population and
real GDP, Laspeyres constant prices. Source: Heston et al. (2009).

Government size

Government spending as a share of GDP (from real GDP Laspeyres
constant prices). Source: Heston et al. (2009).

Inflation

Inflation plus 100 (in natural log). Source: Author’s construction using
International Financial Statistics data (IMF, 2010).

Trade

Residual of a regression of the natural log of trade openness (export plus
imports divided by GDP, from real GDP Laspeyres constant prices) on the
natural log of the area of the country, natural log of population, landlocked
dummy, net oil exporter dummy, and time dummies. Source: Author’s
construction using data from Heston et al. (2009) for the trade openness
indicator and population, from Mayer and Zignago (2006) for area of a
country and landlocked dummy, and from UNCOMTRADE (2010) for the
construction of the net exporter oil dummy (this estimation assumes oil
dummy equals to zero for missing observations).

Banking crisis

Banking crisis dummy equal to 1 if a country experienced a financial crisis
in that year. Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) for initial years and
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) for duration of crisis.

Trade openness

Exports plus imports as a share of GDP (from real GDP Laspeyres constant
prices). Source: Heston et al. (2009).

Financial openness

Index of capital account openness. Source: Chinn and Ito (2008).
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Table 1. Variable description and source (continued)*
Variable description and source
Country risk

Composite index of country risk. Index composed by financial, economic
and political risk indices. The political risk rating contributes 50% of the
composite rating, while the financial and economic risk ratings each
contribute 25%.

Political risk

Composed by the following 12 components: government stability,
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order,
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.

Financial risk

Composed by the following 5 components: foreign debt as a percentage of
GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and
services, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and service,
net international liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange rate
stability.

Economic risk

Composed by the following 5 components: GDP per head, real GDP
growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as a percentage, current
account as a percentage of GDP.

Law and order

The law component refers to the strength and impartiality of the legal
system, and the order component relates to the assessment of popular
observance of the law.

Government stability This indicator relates to the government’s ability to carry out its declared
programs and its ability to stay in office. This indicator is composed by
government unity, legislative strength and popular support.
Investment profile

This indicator relates to the risks to investment, where it is composed by
contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays.

Internal conflict

Indicator related to internal political violence and its actual or potential
impact on governance. It is composed by civil war/coup threat,
terrorism/Political violence, and civil disorder.

*The source for variables in this section is the Political Risk Group (2010).
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Table 2. Impact of Financial Development on Growth Data – Summary Statistics
Annual observation, 1961-2007, 18 countries (statistics on time demeaned data)
Obs.

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

ln(GDP per capita)

846

1.10E-10

0.516

-1.608

1.188

ln(Finc Dev)

846

7.19E-10

0.569

-1.969

1.315

ln(Initial GDP per cap)

846

2.60E-10

0.513

-1.591

1.125

ln(Government Size)

846

3.54E-11

0.337

-1.191

0.691

Trade

846

-1.27E-10

0.449

-1.396

1.229

Inflation

846

2.22E-10

0.359

-0.651

4.167

Table 3. Determinants of Financial Development Data - Summary Statistics
5 year average observations, 1970-2007, 18 countries
Obs.

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

ln(Finc dev)

144

-1.555

0.565

-3.212

-0.155

ln(GDP per capita)

144

8.698

0.541

7.330

10.075

ln(Trade openness)

144

3.953

0.608

2.561

5.283

Banking crisis

144

0.108

0.230

0.000

1.000

Financial openness

144

0.320

1.452

-1.812

2.532

Trade open*Finc open

144

1.597

5.998

-7.429

13.375

Country risk

90

62.901

10.515

34.600

81.981

Financial risk

90

32.722

7.541

11.883

45.986

Political risk

90

60.239

11.454

28.383

81.167

Economic risk

90

32.745

4.783

15.817

44.486

Law and order

90

2.796

1.021

1.000

5.000

Government stability

90

6.999

1.732

2.283

9.681

Investment profile

90

6.764

2.228

1.167

11.500

Internal conflict

90

8.020

2.256

0.350

11.139
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Table 4. Impact of financial development on economic growth (Pooled Mean Group Estimator)
Variables

All countries
Coeff
Std.Error

High income countries
Coeff
Std.Error

Long Run Coefficients
Financial Development
Initial GDP per capita
Government Size
Trade
Inflation

0.075 ***
0.522 ***
0.295 ***
0.280 ***
-0.059

0.018
0.110
0.076
0.060
0.038

0.090 ***
0.495 ***
0.272 ***
0.317 ***
-0.007

0.018
0.112
0.070
0.061
0.031

-0.081
0.122
0.206 *
0.254 ***
-0.349 ***

0.062
0.280
0.122
0.092
0.132

Error-Correction Coefficient -

-0.094 ***

0.034

-0.138 **

0.071

-0.079 **

0.036

Short-Run Coefficients
d(GDP per capita)t-1
d(GDP per capita)t-2
d(Financial development)t
d(Financial development)t-1
d(Financial development)t-2
d(Initial GDP per capita)t
d(Government size)t
d(Trade)t
d(Inflation)t
Intercept

0.151 ***
-0.013
-0.040 **
0.003
-0.022 *
0.080 **
-0.207 ***
0.021
-0.058 ***
0.002

0.054
0.040
0.020
0.014
0.013
0.037
0.038
0.028
0.016
0.010

0.193 **
0.054
-0.059 *
-0.005
-0.030 *
0.109 *
-0.256 ***
0.013
-0.057 **
0.029 **

0.081
0.044
0.034
0.021
0.018
0.059
0.068
0.042
0.024
0.014

0.110 *
-0.061
-0.014
0.010
-0.017
0.063
-0.162 ***
0.025
-0.051 **
-0.040

0.067
0.066
0.018
0.020
0.018
0.051
0.032
0.039
0.023
0.028

No. Countries
18
9
No. Observations
792
396
Log Likelihood
1778.832
891.985
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

Low income countries
Coeff
Std.Error

9
396
894.196
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Table 5. Sources of financial development (Arellano and Bond Estimator)
Model 1
Coeff
Std.Err

Model 2
Coeff
Std.Err

Model 3
Coeff
Std.Error

d(Financial development growth)t-1
d(GDP per capita growth)t
d(Banking crisis)t
d(Trade openness)t
d(Financial openness)t
d(Trade Open)t* d(Finc Open)t
d(Country risk)t
d(Financial risk)t
d(Political risk)t
d(Economic risk)t

0.097
0.749 ***
0.554 ***
-0.217
1.390 ***
-0.323 ***

0.063
0.271
0.366 **
-0.606 *
1.152 ***
-0.273 ***
0.022 **

0.055
0.568
0.325*
-0.460
1.271***
-0.301***

0.144
0.671
0.192
0.341
0.450
0.101

0.006
0.017***
-0.012

0.010
0.006
0.022

No. Countries
No. Observations
No. of time periods
Sample period

18
90
5
85-07

Variables

0.112
0.293
0.206
0.250
0.455
0.106

18
72
4
90-07

0.131
0.621
0.184
0.352
0.421
0.096
0.009

18
72
4
90-07

Sargan Test (p-value)
21.163
(0.10)
14.946
(0.31)
14.029
First order serial correl test (p-value)
-2.206
(0.03)
-2.291
(0.02)
-2.233
Sec. order serial correl test (p-value)
-1.784
(0.07)
-1.125
(0.26)
-1.203
Robust standard errors provided. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

(0.37)
(0.03)
(0.23)
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Table 6. Sources of financial development (Arellano and Bond Estimator)
Model 1
Model 2
Variables
Coeff
Std.Err
Coeff
Std.Err
d(Financial development growth)t-1
d(GDP per capita growth)t
d(Banking crisis)t
d(Trade openness)t
d(Financial openness)t
d(Trade Open)t* d(Finc Open)t
d(Law and order)t
d(Government stability)t
d(Investment profile)t
d(Internal conflict)t

0.047
0.788
0.320 *
-0.464
1.220 ***
-0.277 ***
0.145 **

No. countries
No. observations
No. of time periods
Sample period

18
72
4
90-07

0.142
0.494
0.191
0.328
0.395
0.090
0.066

0.006
0.593
0.364 *
-0.590 *
1.465 ***
-0.347 ***

0.139
0.427
0.190
0.341
0.375
0.088

0.098 ***

0.033

Model 3
Coeff
Std.Err

Model 4
Coeff
Std.Err

0.012
0.816*
0.415**
-0.448
1.447***
-0.340***

0.051
0.790
0.338 *
-0.408
1.328 ***
-0.309 ***

0.048*

0.139
0.461
0.185
0.359
0.412
0.096

0.029
0.045 *

18
72
4
90-07

0.148
0.514
0.202
0.362
0.433
0.098

18
72
4
90-07

Sargan Test (p-value)
16.019
(0.25)
18.441
(0.14)
16.628
(0.22)
First order serial correl test (p-value)
-2.13
(0.03)
-1.87
(0.06)
-2.21
(0.03)
Sec. order serial correl test (p-value)
-1.50
(0.13)
-1.27
(0.20)
-1.41
(0.16)
Robust standard errors provided. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

0.026

18
72
4
90-07
17.389
-2.17
-1.58

(0.18)
(0.03)
(0.11)
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